Introduction
The term fiscal responsibility in financial dictionary is defined as "A balanced budget". That is a budget wherein expenditures during a given period of time equal to revenues. The fiscal responsibility also includes a budget in which revenue is greater than the expenditures. Fiscal responsibility is achievable and most of the individuals in their private life practice fiscal responsibility. At individual level everybody knows that they have to live within the budget and usually they do not overspend. Usually overspending by individual results in bad crediting rating which one receives from their creditors due to non-payments or late payments of installments and thus denies future benefits to the person concern.
Fiscal responsibility at national level implies that a government has a balanced budget and has sufficient revenue to pay for its all expenditures. There would be no overspending if government had a true balanced budget in each period. The economic future of a nation largely depends on the way fiscal responsibility is practiced. There is a direct link between budget deficit today and what nation can enjoy in future. Fiscal responsibility is crucial for a nation to remain prosperous and stronger in future. Fiscal responsibility will also determine what kind of future we are leaving to our children and grandchildren for the next 20 years and beyond. If the fiscal responsibility is not practiced the government would spend more money than its income and it borrows for the difference. If the money borrowed come from domestic savings or from domestic lenders the economy will have less money available for capital investment and future productivity growth rates & levels would be lower. If on the other hand deficit is financed by foreign organization/country the country will be indebted with growing debt to the rest of the world, with growing interest costs which must be served every year. If we rely more on foreign sources to finance the resource gap the foreign ownership of our resources would grow and so has our dependences on the actions of foreign governments and investors.
At least for the last two decades poor/ weak fiscal responsibility is being practiced in Pakistan as the fiscal deficit for these two decades remained more than five percent of GDP. The persistent fiscal deficit resulted in the increased debt burden both in terms of internal as well as external debt and interest payments. Our growing dependence on the action of foreign organizations/countries is manifested from one of the conditions laid by IMF on the loan given to Pakistan in 2008; the condition was that the government would raise electricity charges during the loan period. Perceiving the poor fiscal responsibility practiced by the federal government the then finance minister, Mr. Shaukat Aziz, in his budget speech 2001-2002 made a policy commitment by stating that:" government is considering promulgation of a fiscal responsibility law that would limit the government's access to borrowing for financing its expenditure". The 
I-Fiscal Responsibility in Historical Perspective
Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) are becoming increasingly popular. FRLs have been enacted in many countries as permanent institutional devices to enhance the credibility, predictability, and transparency of fiscal policy. FRLs generally combine procedural rules to strengthen fiscal transparency and budget management, with numerical fiscal rules such as ceilings on fiscal deficits and public debt to impose fiscal discipline. In contrast to stand-alone fiscal rules, FRLs aim to provide a comprehensive framework to govern fiscal policy in a single piece of legislation. New Zealand was at the forefront of these reforms, adopting an FRL in 1994 with a strong emphasis on transparency requirements. Since then, FRLs have been implemented in several countries in Latin America, Europe, and Asia.
FRLs are different than stand-alone numerical fiscal rules, which are defined as a permanent constraint on fiscal policy through simple numerical limits on budgetary aggregates (Kopits and Symansky, 1998) . FRLs can be classified according to several characteristics, including the emphasis placed on procedural versus numerical fiscal rules, the jurisdictional coverage (e.g. central versus federal government), sanctions, escape clauses, and cyclical considerations.
Since the 1990s many governments have intensified the search for mechanisms to escape from fiscal populism that had been used as a strategy for winning elections and retaining public office.
National governments have tried various ways to avert these problems. One way has been to pass a fiscal responsibility law (FRL) that prescribes proper fiscal behavior for Subnational Governments (SNGs), provides guidelines for parameters of SNG fiscal legislation, or sets incentives rewards for success or sanctions for failure in following the rules. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, and Peru have done so. Some SNGs, as in Argentina, Australia, Canada, and India have imposed legal constraints on their own fiscal behavior, to reduce the temptation of state administrations to leave fiscal messes and to improve their creditworthiness in the markets.
Although having not formally adopted subnational fiscal responsibility legislation, other countries such as Mexico, Poland, and Turkey have established fiscal rules or debt limitations for SNGs. At this stage it would be appropriate to briefly discuss FRLs for the countries who have recently adopted these laws. The prominent countries are Brazil, India, Argentine and Australia.
In Brazil's political opening through mid-1990s, there were two major subnational debt crises.
Each initial agreement that tried to resolve a crisis actually made the next crisis more likely, because they reinforced the perception that the federal government would provide debt relief, they provided such relief in the form of rescheduling (allowing the stock of debt to keep growing), set ceilings on debt service and thus on the effective political cost, bought out (without penalty) the foreign and private creditors to the SNGs and left the federal government holding the debt. Thus the state politicians suffered minimal consequences for their imprudence and their creditors suffered almost none, and so until 1997 the ex-ante constraints written in the rescheduling agreements were usually quickly evaded (Dillinger 1997; Rodden 2003) . Then in the late 1990s, this vicious cycle of failure in discipline and cooperation came to a halt, as the deeper political and economic incentives had changed after a national macroeconomic adjustment program ended hyperinflation and stabilized the economy. In 1997-98 the federal government made debt restructuring agreements with 25 states, which was finally effective in making them, cease unsustainable borrowing. Three of the four largest debtor states supported the reforms and formed the core of a critical mass of states ready to cooperate in fiscal restraint, making it worthwhile for additional states join at the margin of cooperation. Also, the large scale of the states' non-performing debt to the federal government strengthened the resolve of the borrowing through the annual discussions with states on financing state development plans.
While limiting explosive growth of state debt, the system has not prevented deterioration of fiscal trends as indicated by high levels of debt over GSDP in many states in the late 1990s.
Factors contributing to the deteriorating fiscal accounts across Indian states in the 1990s include: rapid increase in expenditures on salaries, retirement benefits, and pensions and subsidies, increased borrowing to support the growing revenue deficit, and growth in contingent liabilities associated with fiscal support to the public sector units, cooperatives, and the statutory boards.  It shall come into force at once.
The coverage of the act is whole of the Pakistan which means that the four provincial governments, AJK and Northern Areas are required to follow the two policy objectives of the FRDL. Here the question is that in the wake of more provincial autonomy, more transfer of financial resources to provinces, through NFC award and, furthermore, transfer of public related sectors, like health, education and social welfare, to provinces, how the federal government can administered its control over provincial expenditures and revenues?. The fact is that the act imposes restrictions only on the federal government but the provincial governments are not, practically, in the scope/preview of the act. It is therefore imperative that FRDL may also be framed for the provincial governments. The federal government has no control over the provincial expenditures. It worth to note that the first policy objective is related to revenue deficit which is the interplay of revenue and expenditure.
 The FRDL is silent about the absolute fiscal deficit which otherwise is the source of concern for fiscal policy makers. The fiscal deficit is one of the important indicators of fiscal imbalances. The government has given top priority to contain fiscal deficit in it expenditure management strategy. It worth to note that how and why the FDRL act does not consider fiscal deficit as a source of concern, therefore, no targets has been set for reduction in fiscal deficit.
 The fiscal deficit is the excess of total expenditure (Current & Development) over revenue receipts and grants. If we do not consider fiscal deficit as a source of concern but consider revenue deficit as a source of concern this clearly implies that we neglect the development needs of the country. The capital expenditure/development expenditure contributes to the development process in the country. The share of development expenditure in total expenditure is less than 20% which is the manifestation of neglect of development need in FRDL-2005.
IV -Analysis of the principles of sound fiscal & debt management.
In the following paragraphs we will analyze principle of sound fiscal and debt management in seriatim and also the current implementation status of each principle. As it is stated in the debt policy statement that "future levels of debt hinge around the primary balance of the government". Mathematically, the primary balance is the fiscal deficit before the interest payments. Empirically there exists a long run relationship between fiscal deficit and debt relative to GDP. It is argued that large structural primary deficits and interest payments relative to GDP have had an adverse effect on growth in recent years. The FRDL -2005 does not consider the fiscal deficit as its objective; therefore, the targets of debt to GDP ratios for coming years are not seemed to be realistic. In other words the act should have to define targets for fiscal deficit along with the target for debt to GDP ratio.
A. Reducing the revenue deficit to nil not later than the thirtieth
The FRDL -2005 is not effective on the provincial governments, therefore, federal government cannot control borrowing by the provincial governments. For effective debt management policy it is therefore felt that there is a need for provincial fiscal responsibility legislations. The necessity of legislation is supported by the fact that the debt-GDP ratio is combined federal and provincial debt.
As per above table the government seems to full fill the FRDL condition and it is expected that total public debt to GDP ratio will be maintained from the fiscal year 2012-13 and own wards.
There is a need for through investigation that how the target for 60% debt to GDP ratio has been determined. The three sub-conditions of clause-c are analyzed in the above table.
C. Ensure "that in every financial
 The debt reduction strategy ensures continues reduction in total public debt from July 2003 till June 2013 and the and for each year the extent of reduction in debt is not less that 2.5% of estimated GDP for any given year. The row "debt as debt reduction strategy" contains the amount of debt if the strategy is fully followed. The total public debt for fiscal year is Rs.10709 billion whereas the debt should have been Rs.1515.4 Billion in case the debt strategy is fully implemented. There is a gap of Rs.9193.6 Billion between the existing and planned total public debt for 2010-11. In fact the total public debt has increased from Rs.3623 billion in 2002-03 to Rs.10709 billion in 2010-11. The increase in total public debt over the FRDL period is mainly due to persistent high level of fiscal deficit which for Y11 is 6.6% of GDP. In net shall the debt reduction strategy for the fiscal policy formulation of the country.
Interestingly the FRDL overlooked the one of the important action of the government i.e. FRDL did not put any restriction on the federal government borrowing from the SBP. The government borrowing from SBP for budgetary support is steadily increasing over the last two decades.
V. Conclusion
The FRDL was implemented to improve overall fiscal discipline in the country so as to put the country on the desire path of economic growth. The FRDL was not frame on the basis of overall economic situation of the country rather it was frame on the basis of constitutional provision.
The jurisdiction of FRDL is only the federal government and provincial governments are not in its jurisdiction. The FRDL put constrain only on the revenue deficit and ignores the fiscal deficit which is source of concern for the fiscal policy makers. The FRDL put numerical restriction on total public debt but these restrictions (targets of debt to GDP ratios) do not seems to be realistic because empirically there exists a long run relationship between fiscal deficit and debt relative to GDP. As already stated above fiscal deficit is not considered as source of concern and that is why no restriction/limitation is set for the growth of fiscal deficit. The only positive recommendation of FRDL is that in the act the expenditure on social and poverty alleviation has been protected up to 4.5 of GDP for any given year. Since Fy06 the expenditure on social & poverty alleviation has increased rather than any reduction in it and is more than the minimum limit set in the FRDL but these increased expenditures are at the cost of higher debt. In other words we have increased expenditures on social & poverty sector but at the same time we have also increased public debt. The FRDL is silent about the expenditures incurred by the provincial governments on social & poverty related issues.
The budgetary allocation to education & health as % of GDP was required to be doubled from Interestingly the FRDL overlooked the one of the important action of the government i.e. FRDL did not put any restriction on the federal government borrowing from the SBP. The government borrowing from SBP for budgetary support is steadily increasing over the last two decades.
Recommendations:
Following recommendations are suggested to improve the quality of FRDL and to make it more effective.
 The basis of FRDL should be more on economic reality of the country rather than on the basis of constitutional provision.
 There is a need to put restrictions on fiscal deficit besides revenue deficit.
 The jurisdiction of FRDL should be enhanced from federal government to all provincial governments.
 The increased expenditures on social & poverty sector should not be at the cost of increased public debt.
 In order to double expenditure on education and health as percentage of GDP from 2003 to 2013 there must be specific rates by virtue of which the expenditure on these two sectors would be doubled.
 There is a need to put restrictions on federal government borrowing from SBP.
